This book develops an informational theory to account for the coexistence of China's exceptionally resilient authoritarianism and its high decentralization. The nuanced information contained in citizens' complaints, which are filed through the petition system, helps to sustain China's decentralized authoritarianism in three important ways. First, petitions help to alleviate the information asymmetry problem that arises when the central government has less information than lower level governments do. When studying citizens' petitions, higher level governments can obtain valuable and accurate information about local officials' performance in policy implementation, public goods provision, and corruption. Higher level governments need this information in order to effectively utilize the cadre management system to reward good performance and punish malpractice. The result of this interaction is the PRC's relatively high quality of governance and effective control of local officials. There is also a second way in which citizens' petitions help the government to overcome the dictator's dilemma that arises when an authoritarian regime is uncertain about how much support it really enjoys among its citizens. Citizens' specific grievances are revealed in these petitions and are mostly addressed in their beginning stages. When citizens' complaints are rooted in central policy, they set the agenda for policy change in order to maintain social order. There is yet a third benefit conferred upon the PRC by the petition system. Thanks to the petition system, the central government can present itself as the ally of citizens when it addresses the matters raised by their petitions. As a result, the petition system grants the central government an opportunity to hold local officials accountable, scapegoat local authorities, divide citizens and local officials, and justly claim all the credit when its policies succeed. This helps to build citizens' trust in their central government and reinforces its legitimacy in their eyes. In Huntington's terms, the Chinese Communist Party institutionalizes mass support by addressing citizens' grievances expressed through the channel of communication provided by the petition system. In this sense, the complaints of citizens can be very useful tools for regime maintenance. The author substantiates these points with case studies and statistical analysis.
Show moreThis book develops an informational theory to account for the coexistence of China's exceptionally resilient authoritarianism and its high decentralization. The nuanced information contained in citizens' complaints, which are filed through the petition system, helps to sustain China's decentralized authoritarianism in three important ways. First, petitions help to alleviate the information asymmetry problem that arises when the central government has less information than lower level governments do. When studying citizens' petitions, higher level governments can obtain valuable and accurate information about local officials' performance in policy implementation, public goods provision, and corruption. Higher level governments need this information in order to effectively utilize the cadre management system to reward good performance and punish malpractice. The result of this interaction is the PRC's relatively high quality of governance and effective control of local officials. There is also a second way in which citizens' petitions help the government to overcome the dictator's dilemma that arises when an authoritarian regime is uncertain about how much support it really enjoys among its citizens. Citizens' specific grievances are revealed in these petitions and are mostly addressed in their beginning stages. When citizens' complaints are rooted in central policy, they set the agenda for policy change in order to maintain social order. There is yet a third benefit conferred upon the PRC by the petition system. Thanks to the petition system, the central government can present itself as the ally of citizens when it addresses the matters raised by their petitions. As a result, the petition system grants the central government an opportunity to hold local officials accountable, scapegoat local authorities, divide citizens and local officials, and justly claim all the credit when its policies succeed. This helps to build citizens' trust in their central government and reinforces its legitimacy in their eyes. In Huntington's terms, the Chinese Communist Party institutionalizes mass support by addressing citizens' grievances expressed through the channel of communication provided by the petition system. In this sense, the complaints of citizens can be very useful tools for regime maintenance. The author substantiates these points with case studies and statistical analysis.
Show moreChapter 1 Introduction: Petitions and Decentralized
Authoritarianism in China
Chapter 2 Villager’s Petitions: Holding Local Officials
Accountable
Chapter 3 Petitions and Stability: A Tale of Two Townships
Chapter 4 Petitioning Beijing: The Case of Jiangxi Province
Chapter 5 The Policy Effects of Petitions
Chapter 6 Who Petitions?
Chapter 7 Conclusion: Petitions and China’s Proactive
Authoritarianism
Jing Chen is assistant professor of political science at Hartwick College.
With extensive qualitative and quantitative data collected in
China, this book develops an informational theory to account for
the coexistence of China’s resilient authoritarianism and its high
decentralization.... Methodologically, Chen substantiates her
points by detailed cases, in-depth interviews and statistical
analysis of petitions.... Students, researchers, and teachers who
are interested in the Chinese petition system would gain insights
from this book.
*China Information*
This is a well-researched and well-presented book. It is a
systematic study on the government's use of petitions at both the
national and local levels. Its claim that petitions contribute to
regime stability or resilience in China is valid. Useful Complaints
should be of interest to those who wish to understand how the
government interacts with the people of China and how the Chinese
political system is operated.
*China Quarterly*
Chen’s important study...contribute[s] to our understanding of the
petition system, and to the institutions and modes of Chinese
governance as a whole.
*Journal of Chinese Political Science*
The anthology edited by Brian Christopher Jones [Law and Politics
of the Taiwan Sunflower and Hong Kong Umbrella Movements] and the
monograph by Jing Chen provide authoritative case studies that
illustrate both the possibilities and limitations of citizen action
to shape government policy. Each book is a must for anyone
concerned with the future of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China. Each
volume raises issues for other countries as well, including the
United States.
*Asian Perspective*
Useful Complaints embodies the best of cutting-edge research on
contentious politics in China: fresh new data, mixed methods and
extensive fieldwork. Chen skillfully combines qualitative
comparative case studies with quantitative analysis of original
datasets on petition mobilization. A great strength of Useful
Complaints is in Chen’s meticulous research at the grassroots,
which provides fresh new insights into how local governments cope
with protests and, more importantly, why some local governments
prove much more capable at the task of maintaining stability than
others. Chen also sheds light on under-studied phenomena in
contentious politics, such as why some villagers participate in
collective petitions while others do not. Useful Complaints makes a
compelling argument that the Chinese state proactively uses the
petitioning system as a governance tool to promote the durability
of CCP rule.
*Christopher Heurlin, Bowdoin College*
This book offers a rich and clear analysis of how the Chinese state
uses the petition system to achieve political responsiveness and
hold local officials accountable. This is an important contribution
to the debate on authoritarian resilience in China.
*Xi Chen, The Chinese University of Hong Kong*
With a range of original qualitative and quantitative data
collected from field work, Professor Jing Chen shows that China’s
petition system plays a significant role in helping the government
monitor local officials’ performance, gather inputs for national
policy changes, and shift blame to local authorities, all of which
contribute to the resilience of decentralized authoritarianism.
This book is an important read for anyone interested in Chinese
politics, petitions and protest, or authoritarianism.
*Haifeng Huang, University of California, Merced*
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