Table of Contents

Introduction; 1. New Work for a theory of universals; 2. Putnam's paradox; 3. Against structural universals; 4. A comment on Armstrong and Forrest; 5. Extrinsic properties; 6. Defining 'intrinsic' (with Rae Langton); 7. Finkish dispositions; 8. Noneism or Allism?; 9. Many, but almost one; 10. Casati and Varzi on holes (with Stephanie Lewis); 11. Rearrangement of particles: reply to Lowe; 12. Armstrong on combinatorial possibility; 13. A world of truthmakers?; 14. Maudlin and modal mystery; 15. Humean supervenience debugged; 16. Psychophysical and theoretical identifications; 17. What experience teaches; 18. Reduction of mind; 19. Should a materialist believe in Qualia?; 20. Naming the colours; 21. Percepts and color mosaics in visual experience; 22. Individuation by acquaintance and by stipulation; 23. Why conditionalize?; 24. What puzzling Pierre does not believe; 25. Elusive knowledge; Index.

Promotional Information

This second volume of papers is devoted to Lewis's work in metaphysics and epistemology.