Physicalism has in recent years become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects (such as numbers), and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical world itself is called into question. Both strong 'reductionist' versions and weaker 'supervenience' theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. These essays suggest forcefully that the advance of physicalism has been achieved more by talking down the problems that it faces than by solving them.
Physicalism has in recent years become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects (such as numbers), and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical world itself is called into question. Both strong 'reductionist' versions and weaker 'supervenience' theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. These essays suggest forcefully that the advance of physicalism has been achieved more by talking down the problems that it faces than by solving them.
Howard Robinson: Introduction
1: George Myro: Thinking
2: Bob Hale: Physicalism and Mathematics
3: Ralph Walker: Transcendental Arguments Against Physicalism
4: Grant Gillett: Actions, Causes, and Mental Ascriptions
5: George Bealer: Materialism and the Logical Structure of
Intentionality
6: Steven J. Wagner: Truth, Physicalism, and Ultimate Theory
7: Howard Robinson: The Anti-Materialist Strategy and the
`Knowledge Argument'
8: Richard Warner: Incorrigibility
9: Nicholas Nathan: Weak Materialism
10: A.D. Smith: Non-Reductive Physicalism?
11: Peter Forrest: Difficulties with Physicalism, and a Programme
for Dualists
12: Michael Lockwood: The Grain Problem
13: John Foster: The Succinct Case for Idealism
Bibliography, Index
Howard Robinson is Soros Professor of Philosophy at the Eötvös
Loránd University, Budapest, and Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at
the University of Liverpool. He is author of Matter and Sense (CUP,
1982) and Perception (Routledge, 1994), editor of George Berkeley's
Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues in the World's
Classics series (OUP 1996), and co-editor of the following volumes:
Essays on
Berkeley (OUP, 1985), The Pursuit of Mind (Carcanet, 1991), and
Aristotle and the Later Tradition (OUP, 1991).
a considerable set of challenges to contemporary physicalism. The essays are largely non- technical and are typically clear and substantial. The editor has contributed ... a useful introduction identifying the essays' main themes and clarifying some important problems facing physicalism ... Recommended for any library supporting advanced undergraduate or graduate work in philosophy and psychology. Paul K. Moser, Choice
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