Hardback : £58.78
Why do unelected federal judges have so much power to make policy in the United States? Why were federal judges able to thwart apparent legislative victories won by labor organizations in the Lochner era? Most scholars who have addressed such questions assume that the answer lies in the judiciary's constitutionally guaranteed independence, and thus worry that insulated judges threaten democracy when they stray from baseline positions chosen by legislators. Originally published in 2003, this book argues for a fundamental shift in the way scholars think about judicial policy-making. Scholars need to notice that legislators also empower judges to make policy as a means of escaping accountability. This study of legislative deference to the courts offers a dramatic reinterpretation of the history of twentieth-century labor law and shows how attention to legislative deferrals can help scholars to address vexing questions about the consequences of judicial power in a democracy.
Why do unelected federal judges have so much power to make policy in the United States? Why were federal judges able to thwart apparent legislative victories won by labor organizations in the Lochner era? Most scholars who have addressed such questions assume that the answer lies in the judiciary's constitutionally guaranteed independence, and thus worry that insulated judges threaten democracy when they stray from baseline positions chosen by legislators. Originally published in 2003, this book argues for a fundamental shift in the way scholars think about judicial policy-making. Scholars need to notice that legislators also empower judges to make policy as a means of escaping accountability. This study of legislative deference to the courts offers a dramatic reinterpretation of the history of twentieth-century labor law and shows how attention to legislative deferrals can help scholars to address vexing questions about the consequences of judicial power in a democracy.
Acknowledgements; Preface; 1. Rethinking judicial policy making in a separation of powers system; 2. False victories: labor, congress, and the courts, 1898–1935; 3. 'As harmless as an infant': the Erdman Act in Congress and the courts; 4. Killing with kindness: legislative ambiguity, judicial policy making, and the Clayton Act; 5. The Norris–LaGuardia Act, for once: learning what to learn from the past; 6. Legislative deferrals and judicial policy making in the administrative state: a brief look at the Wagner Act; 7. Conclusion; Reference list; References; Index.
This book argues for a fundamental shift in the way scholars think about judicial policymaking.
"...intriguing, well-crafted, and thoroughly readable..." Journal
of Interdisciplinary History
"[T]his is a terrific book." The Law and Politics Book Review
"An insightful and innovative excursion into the complexities of
congressional-judicial interaction, with a particular focus on how
legislative action, or inaction, shapes the ultimate judicial
interpretation of a law. It is a useful--indeed
compelling--reminder that judicial decisions are not necessarily
the product of ideological storks." Joel B. Grossman, Johns Hopkins
University
"Professor Lovell highlights an important feature in American
politics, deliberate statutory ambiguity, offers several
well-documented and well-written case studies of deliberate
statutory anbiguity, and successfully demonstrates that both
existing theories of statutory interpretation and the judicial
function do not adequately account for this phenomenon. This is a
book persons interested in public law, American political
development, and labor law will find fascinating." Mark Graber,
University of Maryland
"In his Legislative Deferrals George Lovell uses four case studies
of the legislative and judicial history of federal statutes
governing industrial relations between 1898 and 1939 to probe the
intricate dance between congress and the courts over the
implementation of such laws. Political and labor historians
especially will learn much from Lovell's key findings. First, that
conservative, anti-labor jurists did not wrest power
undemocratically from the people's representatives; instead,
legislators finessed controversial political issues by consciously
deferring to judicial authority. Second, that labor leaders lacked
effective political influence, and meekly accepted diluted
legislative compromises granted as a reward for behaving
responsibly. Lovell's book smartly reinterprets the history of
congressional industrial relations, law reform, and judicial
intervention in the political process." Melvyn Dubofsky, Binghamton
University, State University of New York
"The strengths of Lovell's book are many. It is well organized with
a clear hypothesis and a persuasive set of conclusions. It is also
elegantly written. Indeed, the stories the author recounts, and the
way he recounts them, certainly depict fascinating moments in
American political history... a terrific book." Law and Politics
Book Review
"[Lovell] makes a compelling case. The book is clearly written and
well documented.... Highly recommended." Choice
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