Introduction
1: The standard
2: Basic notions of noncooperative game theory
3: The successes of game theory
4: The problems of game theory
5: Bounded rationality and retrospection
Bibliography
Index
`fascinating little book' Jean Tirole, Journal of Economic
Literature
`a book I could not put down ... the exposition is remarkably
clear' Journal of Economic Perspectives
`Will rapidly be established as a basic reference for students and
their teachers ... even the less mathematically inclined economists
will find much to gain from the application of new game theory
techniques in economics.' Scottish Journal of Political Economy
'It is partly a measure of how much macroeconomics has ceased to be
a separate subject from microeconomics that workers in my field
will now find so much to interest them in this book. It is more a
measure of how engaging this book is.'
Thomas J. Sargent, University of Chicago, Journal of Political
Economy
'The writing is in a very personalised style. Though the book is
putatively for the novice, or less formally trained reader, the
presentation and the level of the debate does make certain demands.
It nevertheless is frontline stuff.'
Economics Times, April 1992
'I view Krep's discussions in the book as both interesting and
helpful in describing certain key weaknesses of standard game
theory.'
Ronald Heiner, George Mason University, Constitutional Political
Economy, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1992
'Kreps has written a book that makes a sincere attempt to demystify
game theory for the uninitiated and set the stage for a serious
appraisal of the scope and limitations of game theory ... it does
manage to convey a flavour of the excitement that comes from
grappling with strategic behaviour, and hopefully should convince
the reader with an open mind that game theoretic questions and
applications are abstractions of relevant economic issues.'
Anindya Sen, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol XXVII No 14 April
4, 1992
Ask a Question About this Product More... |