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The Fear of Invasion presents a new interpretation of British preparation for War before 1914. It argues that protecting the British Isles from invasion was the foundation upon which all other plans for the defence of the Empire were built up. Home defence determined the amount of resources available for other tasks and the relative focus of the Army and Navy, as both played an important role in preventing an invasion. As politicians were reluctant to
prepare for offensive British participation in a future war, home defence became the means by which the government contributed to an ill-defined British 'grand' strategy. The Royal Navy formed
the backbone of British defensive preparations. However, after 1905 the Navy came to view the threat of a German invasion of the British Isles as a far more credible threat than is commonly realised. As the Army became more closely associated with operations in France, the Navy thus devoted an ever-greater amount of time and effort to safeguarding the vulnerable east coast. In this manner preventing an invasion came to exert a 'very insidious' effect on the Navy by the outbreak of War in 1914.
This book explains how and why this came to pass, and what it can tell us about the role of government in forming strategy.
The Fear of Invasion presents a new interpretation of British preparation for War before 1914. It argues that protecting the British Isles from invasion was the foundation upon which all other plans for the defence of the Empire were built up. Home defence determined the amount of resources available for other tasks and the relative focus of the Army and Navy, as both played an important role in preventing an invasion. As politicians were reluctant to
prepare for offensive British participation in a future war, home defence became the means by which the government contributed to an ill-defined British 'grand' strategy. The Royal Navy formed
the backbone of British defensive preparations. However, after 1905 the Navy came to view the threat of a German invasion of the British Isles as a far more credible threat than is commonly realised. As the Army became more closely associated with operations in France, the Navy thus devoted an ever-greater amount of time and effort to safeguarding the vulnerable east coast. In this manner preventing an invasion came to exert a 'very insidious' effect on the Navy by the outbreak of War in 1914.
This book explains how and why this came to pass, and what it can tell us about the role of government in forming strategy.
Introduction
1: The Command of the Sea
2: The Military Resources of the Empire
3: 'Practical Politics'
4: Preparing for War
5: The German Threat
6: The North Sea Guard
7: A Growing Burden
8: Surrendering the Initiative
Conclusion
David G. Morgan-Owen is a lecturer in Defence Studies at King's
College London. He was previously a Visiting Research Fellow at the
National Museum of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth, and an Associate of
the Centre for Maritime Historical Studies at the University of
Exeter, where he gained his PhD in 2013. Dr. Morgan-Owen has
published on British strategy before and during the First World War
in the English Historical Review, War in History,
Journal of Strategic Studies, and the International History Review.
Morgan-Owen's outstanding book emphasises the failure of
well-meaning, but ignorant, and ideologically constrained ministers
to settle national strategy ... This landmark text has re-set the
debate.
*Andrew Lambert, Journal of Strategic Studies*
Morgan-Owen has brought out more clearly, and in much greater
detail than previous authors, the chaotic and unmanaged interaction
between the two services when they contemplated how to deter an
invader.
*David French, Journal of Modern History*
thought provoking and puts forward a high persuasive case...
Morgan-Owen's work represents a major contribution to the
historiography
*Prof Ian Beckett, Journal of the Society for Army Historical
Research*
The Fear of Invasion is a landmark study... These are
paradigm-changing conclusions.
*Prof Matthew Seligmann, War in History*
Occasionally a book comes along that offers important new insights
into a supposedly familiar subject. David G Morgan-Owen's masterly
The Fear of Invasion is such a work.
*Prof Gary Sheffield, Stand to!*
an impressive debut monograph which finds a fresh approach...and
establishes him as an historian to watch
*Dr Jonathan Boff, English Historical Review*
this book represents a major correction to the orthodox
interpretation of British naval policy presented in Arthur Marder's
seminal works on the Royal Navy. It also demolishes the central
arguments of the controversial 'revisionist' school of naval
historians. Given the volume of scholarly attention lavished on the
problem of British strategy on the eve of the First World War, this
is an impressive achievement.
*Professor Christoper Bell, Twentieth Century British History*
a brilliantly argued and impressively well-researched monograph.
Morgan-Owen's book will doubtless become a key reference alongside
existing works on pre-Great War British war planning, and offers
important new insight into the workings of the political and
military leadership who tried to decide how to pursue an offensive
military policy while also defending the heart of the empire
itself.
*Christian Melby, Reviews in History*
There is a wealth of detail in The Fear of Invasion, which takes
the reader through a tale of Victorian and Edwardian inter-service
rivalry, febrile national politics, huge defence budgets but a
painful lack of readily available cash, seemingly unending overseas
commitments and a global scene that was at best confusing and at
worse downright dangerous. Delete the words 'Victorian and
Edwardian' and the thoughtful reader could easily start to draw
parallels to today. That is one of the joys of well-written
history: without necessarily setting out to do so, it allows us to
take stock of our own woes and, if we are lucky, start to see a way
through them. Unfortunately, a century ago the conglomeration of
strategy, politics and military planning throughout Europe led to
catastrophic war. We must hope that the many similarities to
evident to contemporary events in this book end short of full
replication.
*Commander Kevin Rowlands RN, The Naval Review*
Morgan-Owen's important book reminds us of the fundamental
importance of civilian political leadership to strategy making and
war-planning. He offers a study of the failure of this leadership
in the years leading up to World War I, and a timely lesson about
the dangers of a strategy based on fear of new threats, rather than
on an appreciation of one's own strengths.
*Professor John Bew, War on the Rocks*
This is a fundamentally new way of looking at the position of
Britain in 1914. Most historians have assumed that what happened to
the BEF had to happen. Morgan-Owen suggests otherwise, and his
arguments will be required reading for anyone dealing with British
policy on the outbreak of war. Was there an alternative to the
Western Front? Did the incapacity of the navy condemn Britain to
the killing fields of France and Flanders? Raising questions such
as these will have a profound effect on the intellectual approach
to the entire field. Few books manage such a feat. David
Morgan-Owen has achieved a great deal with this first book. I look
forward to his subsequent work, which might help settle some of the
uncertainties he has now raised.
*Professor Robin Prior, Wartime*
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