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A defense of regulatory agencies’ efforts to combine public consultation with bureaucratic expertise to serve the interest of all citizens
The statutory delegation of rule–making authority to the executive has recently become a source of controversy. There are guiding models, but none, Susan Rose-Ackerman claims, is a good fit with the needs of regulating in the public interest. Using a cross–national comparison of public policy-making in the United States, France, the UK, and Germany, she argues that public participation inside executive rule-making processes is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of regulatory policy-making.
A defense of regulatory agencies’ efforts to combine public consultation with bureaucratic expertise to serve the interest of all citizens
The statutory delegation of rule–making authority to the executive has recently become a source of controversy. There are guiding models, but none, Susan Rose-Ackerman claims, is a good fit with the needs of regulating in the public interest. Using a cross–national comparison of public policy-making in the United States, France, the UK, and Germany, she argues that public participation inside executive rule-making processes is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of regulatory policy-making.
Susan Rose‑Ackerman is Henry R. Luce Professor Emeritus of Law and Political Science at Yale University.
“[Rose-Ackerman] stresses that the real challenge is . . . to
establish a public law that enhances the democratic accountability
of bureaucrats and political appointees. . . . This book is a
valuable advance in specificity with respect to principles and
instruments [of executive policymaking]. . . . It will be of equal
value to public lawyers and other social scientists interested in
government.”—Giacinto della Cananea, French Yearbook of Public
Law
“Makes an important case in favour of a more developed
administrative law systems underlying a balanced participatory
decision-making framework. . . . The book invites deep reflections
on how administrative law can be refined in this sense and calls on
comparative legal scholarship to analyse and address how those
questions have been dealt with across the globe . . . [and] is to
be read and discussed widely, both by theorists and practitioners
of administrative law and by social planners looking to enhance the
accountability of executive decision-making.”—Pieter van
Cleynenbreughel, British Association of Comparative Law
Winner of the 2022 Gustav Ranis International Prize for Best Book,
sponsored by Yale MacMillan Center
“Susan Rose-Ackerman has produced a valuable and insightful work
that considers endemic issues of policy making accountability by
the executive and the role of public participation in executive
rule making in four countries.”—Paul Craig, St John’s College
“Given the precarious state of popular trust in government across
the globe, this exceptional exploration of how four advanced
democracies pursue legitimacy in the bureaucratic implementation of
regulatory law makes an invaluable contribution.”—Peter M. Shane,
author of Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens
American Democracy
“Capstone of Susan Rose-Ackerman’s influential writings about
comparative administrative law, her remarkable exploration of the
democratic accountability of administrative governance in France,
Germany, the UK and the US brings fresh and important understanding
to the interactions among forms of government, the rule of law, and
the contemporary urgency of maintaining democratic
institutions.”—Peter Strauss, author of Administrative Justice in
the United States
“Democracy and Executive Power reflects decades of Susan
Rose-Ackerman’s profound thinking about how the rule of law,
accountability, democracy, and participation relate to how most law
is made in the world’s four most influential legal systems. Her
argument is at once pro-bureaucratic, pro-legal, and
pro-democratic. The book is essential reading for those seeking to
understand and reform executive rule-making in any democracy.”—Jeff
King, University College London
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