The Marine Corps covered itself in glory in World War II with victories over the Japanese in hard-fought battles such as Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Iwo Jima. While these battles are well known, those who led the Marines into them have remained obscure until now.
In Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corps Generals in World War II, Stephen R. Taaffe analyzes the fifteen high-level Marine generals who led the Corps' six combat divisions and two corps in the conflict. He concludes that these leaders played an indispensable and unheralded role in organizing, training, and leading their men to victory.
Taaffe insists there was nothing inevitable about the Marine Corps' success in World War II. The small pre-war size of the Corps meant that its commandant had to draw his combat leaders from a small pool of officers who often lacked the education of their Army and Navy counterparts. Indeed, there were fewer than one hundred Marine officers with the necessary rank, background, character, and skills for its high-level combat assignments. Moreover, the Army and Navy froze the Marines out of high-level strategic decisions and frequently impinged on Marine prerogatives. There were no Marines in the Joint Chiefs of Staff or at the head of the Pacific War's geographic theaters, so the Marines usually had little influence over the island targets selected for them. In addition to bureaucratic obstacles, constricted geography and vicious Japanese opposition limited opportunities for Marine generals to earn the kind of renown that Army and Navy commanders achieved elsewhere. In most of its battles on small Pacific War islands, Marine generals had neither the option nor inclination to engage in sophisticated tactics, but they instead relied in direct frontal assaults that resulted in heavy casualties. Such losses against targets of often questionable strategic value sometimes called into question the Marine Corps' doctrine, mission, and the quality of its combat generals.
Despite these difficulties, Marine combat commanders repeatedly overcame challenges and fulfilled their missions. Their ability to do so does credit to the Corps and demonstrates that these generals deserve more attention from historians than they have so far received.
The Marine Corps covered itself in glory in World War II with victories over the Japanese in hard-fought battles such as Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Iwo Jima. While these battles are well known, those who led the Marines into them have remained obscure until now.
In Commanding the Pacific: Marine Corps Generals in World War II, Stephen R. Taaffe analyzes the fifteen high-level Marine generals who led the Corps' six combat divisions and two corps in the conflict. He concludes that these leaders played an indispensable and unheralded role in organizing, training, and leading their men to victory.
Taaffe insists there was nothing inevitable about the Marine Corps' success in World War II. The small pre-war size of the Corps meant that its commandant had to draw his combat leaders from a small pool of officers who often lacked the education of their Army and Navy counterparts. Indeed, there were fewer than one hundred Marine officers with the necessary rank, background, character, and skills for its high-level combat assignments. Moreover, the Army and Navy froze the Marines out of high-level strategic decisions and frequently impinged on Marine prerogatives. There were no Marines in the Joint Chiefs of Staff or at the head of the Pacific War's geographic theaters, so the Marines usually had little influence over the island targets selected for them. In addition to bureaucratic obstacles, constricted geography and vicious Japanese opposition limited opportunities for Marine generals to earn the kind of renown that Army and Navy commanders achieved elsewhere. In most of its battles on small Pacific War islands, Marine generals had neither the option nor inclination to engage in sophisticated tactics, but they instead relied in direct frontal assaults that resulted in heavy casualties. Such losses against targets of often questionable strategic value sometimes called into question the Marine Corps' doctrine, mission, and the quality of its combat generals.
Despite these difficulties, Marine combat commanders repeatedly overcame challenges and fulfilled their missions. Their ability to do so does credit to the Corps and demonstrates that these generals deserve more attention from historians than they have so far received.
Stephen R. Taaffe is a professor of history at Stephen F. Austin State University, where he specializes in U.S. military history. He received his bachelor's degree from Grove City College and his graduate degrees from Ohio University.
Stephen R. Taaffe's Commanding the Pacific is an instant classic.
Readers interested in the Marine Corps, combat leadership, and
World War II will find it invaluable. In combination with his
previous works, this outstanding volume highlights Taaffe as the
preeminent scholar on senior command in the U.S. military during
America's wars." —William A. Taylor, author of Military Service and
American Democracy; Lee Drain Endowed University Professorship,
Angelo State University
"In Commanding the Pacific, Stephen R. Taaffe puts on a writing
clinic as he blends biographical sketches and personality studies
with a historical narrative of the strategic and operational levels
of the Pacific War. He also effortlessly weaves analysis into this
mix. Readers can also glean lessons and habits of mind about
leadership and teamwork." —David J. Ulbrich, author of Preparing
for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Marine Corps,
1939-1943
"Stephen R. Taafe has written a long-overdue history of the
commanding generals of the six large combat divisions fielded by
the U.S. Marine Corps during World War II. Because of the far-flung
nature of combat in the Pacific,1941-1945, the performance of many
of these crucial division commanders has been overlooked by
historians. Thankfully, this is no longer the case. While the
author does not hesitate to criticize some of these division
commanders, most of whom had never commanded formations larger than
a single regiment, his excellent history highlights the tremendous
difficulty the entire Navy-Marine Corps team faced, especially
toward the end of the war, when the Japanese decided that fanatical
last-stand defensive efforts, like the ones conducted on Iwo Jima
and Okinawa, were the best way to convince the Americans to not
even contemplate an invasion of their home islands." —Charles P.
Neimeyer, Ph.D., professor, Naval War College, Fleet Support
Program
"Much of our understanding of the Marine Corps in World War II has
been shaped by the perspectives of the fighting men. Dutifully
researched and exceptionally written, Commanding in the Pacific
provides a much-needed analysis of USMC leadership to allow a
fuller comprehension and appreciation of the Marine experience."
—Bradford A. Wineman, professor of military history, U.S. Marine
Corps Command & Staff College
|
Ask a Question About this Product More... |
|
